Independence

A Type A inspection body provides a list of consultants for its client to choose from, to help the client to correct the non-conformities found during inspection.

The inspection body claimed that the chosen consultant was too busy. So, the inspection body sent the consultant’s improvement suggestions to its client on behalf of the consultant. Does this affect the independence or impartiality of the Type A inspection body according to ISO/IEC 17020:2012? If the inspection body indeed violates the ISO/IEC 17020:2012, which articles of the standard the body violated? The inspection body has not done any risk evaluation before what it has done.

STANDARD: ISO/IEC 17020  ·  CLAUSE:  4.1.3 ·  TOPIC: Independence

Answer:

It is not clear from the question if there is any formal relationship between the IB and the consultant(s) although there clearly is a relationship if the IB is acting as a conduit for information between their customer and the consultant and is therefore involved with the process for consultancy.  There are questions about independence if there is a relationship with the consultant and the relationship with the IB’s customer is also impacted if there could be a perception of the IB providing improvement suggestions to its customer. There is a threat to the CAB’s impartiality as a consequence of their actions and the perceived relationship with the consultant.  It was agreed that there must be a risk analysis in place to examine the relationship and demonstrate that the IB has looked at this possible risk to impartiality.  The outcome of the risk analysis will further inform whether the Type A criteria are met. Clause 4.1.3 is the one that is not being complied with in this situation.  See also Annex A.1.  Also if risks are identified, they need to be mitigated (clause 4.1.4).

What’s the potential risk of shared personnel in laboratory activities (under ISO/IEC 17025) and inspection work (under ISO/IEC 17020)? How can we solve it?

STANDARD: ISO/IEC 17020  ·  CLAUSE: 4.1.3  ·  TOPIC: Independence

Answer:

ISO/IEC 17020, clause 4.1.3 requires an accredited IB to evaluate its risks to impartiality on an ongoing basis, taking into account risks from its activities, relationships, etc. It is expected that the IB will identify these risks, as they can be complex and ever changing. Clause 4.1.4 goes on the require that you figure out how to solve it yourself.

Could the inspection body type A (that accredited according to ISO 17020 standard) provide services as inspection body type C for a different inspection scheme (without accreditation according to ISO/IEC 17020 standard to type c)?

STANDARD: ISO/IEC 17020  ·  CLAUSE:   ·  TOPIC: Independence

Answer:

It is possible for an IB to be a different ‘Type’ of IB for different inspection activities/schemes. There is no requirement that prevents an IB performing activities outside of its accreditation for different schemes, as long as it does not present a conflict or risk to the IB’s impartiality for its accredited activities. See ILAC P15 4.1.6 n1: this refers to the inspection activity on the scope of accreditation   Yes, a Type A is allowed to work as a Type C for a different scheme as long it is not for the same item inspected. You have to evaluate your independence and risks to impartiality for every relationship you are engaged in, and if they impact your ability to maintain your impartiality. This is even if you are engaged in unaccredited work, if that relationship has the potential to influence your accredited work.

In the context of ISO/IEC 17020 and independence, could you explain the position of ISO/IEC 17020 on a situation where the Inspection Body (Type A) utilises a separate sister company (common ownership, no parent or holding company) to complete the accredited testing used to determine the result of the inspection, where personnel from the IB also have a role in the laboratory testing.

STANDARD: ISO/IEC 17020  ·  CLAUSE: 6.3.1  ·  TOPIC: Independence

Answer:

If a company relies on another legal entity to perform an accredited test or inspection, clause 6.3.1 spells out what must be assured by the accredited inspection body. There are many variables in the situation described to be able to give a comprehensive answer. However, if somebody is performing an accredited test or inspection, they need to meet all of the requirements of the applicable standard. If the individual works for both companies in this scenario, such as a construction inspection company that provides both testing and inspection, then they would need to be authorized by the company to perform the accredited test or inspection. They must also follow the procedures that are laid out by the accredited company, to include training, oversight, etc.

Consider the case where an inspection body (IB) is a public enterprise that reports administratively to a Ministry. The Board and the Director General of the IB are appointed by the Ministry, and the IB reports financial results and overall performance to the Ministry. The Ministry requires assurance on the quality of grains, cereals and pulses for export and also requires an assurance of the same as imported into the country. The Ministry submits the sample to the IB, and following inspection, the inspection report is submitted to the Ministry for acceptance or rejection of the batch. The Ministry is the biggest client of the IB, with over 90% of the order volume coming from the Ministry.

Does this inspection body qualify as a type A inspection body?

STANDARD: ISO/IEC 17020  ·  CLAUSE: Clause 4.1.6  ·  TOPIC: Independence

Answer:

The situation described is not acceptable for a type A inspection body. The scope statement in ISO/IEC 17020 makes clear that one of the major aims of the standard is to ensure the impartiality and consistency of inspection activities. According to ISO/IEC 17020, Annex A.1d) the following apply to inspection bodies type A: “The inspection body shall not be linked to a separate legal entity engaged in the design, manufacture, supply, installation, purchase, ownership, use or maintenance of the items inspected by the following: – Directly reporting to the same higher level of management, except where this cannot influence the outcome of an inspection – Contractual commitments, or other means that may have an ability to influence the outcome of an inspection.” In the case described the inspection body fails on both counts. i) The inspection body reports to the Ministry that has a critical role in the supply chain of the products inspected and has a very plausible path for exerting influence. ii) The contractual arrangement between the inspection body and the Ministry means that failing to follow directives from the Ministry could pose an existential threat to the inspection body or its senior management. Two possibilities needs to be considered: a. Does the Ministry have a supplier interest by its role in the provision of grains, cereals and pulses? b. Does the Ministry have a user interest by its role in the provision of grains, cereals and pulses? While the Ministry may or may not directly buy or sell the inspected products, the Ministry has a critical role in the supply chain of the inspected products as its declared role is to control imports and exports. a. The impartiality requirements are all about incentives that organizations have that might result in bias in the inspection activities. An organization that engages in the supply of grains, cereals and pulses has incentives to be biased toward a favorable outcome for the inspection activities. The Ministry’s declared objective is to assure that no substandard grains, cereals or pulses leave or come in to the country. However, Ministries implement policies that are essentially political and therefore the Ministry could plausibly have political motives to influence the results of inspections. For example, if the Government has pledged to reduce imports, to support local producers, there could be pressure on the inspection body from the Ministry to fail imported marginal products. b. For exports the Ministry has the declared interest of the user of these products in the foreign country, as the Ministry wants to assure these users never receive substandard products. However, if the Government has made commitments to increase exports, exerting pressure on the inspection body to pass marginal products would be a plausible means of increasing export tonnage without bringing in unpopular quality controls on producers. It would be naïve to believe that Ministries did not follow the direction of their Ministers, including wielding influence wherever possible to achieve the targets set for them. As the Ministry appoints the senior management of the inspection body and presumably reviews their performance, there is a clear path for pressure to be applied. Also, in any economy, the possibility for a Minister to subtly apply pressure through the Ministries they oversee should not be disregarded. From the description provided it is clear that the inspection body is not independent of the Ministry. In the situation described it seems that the inspection body and the client directly report to the same higher level of management. The situation that 90% of inspection orders are coming from the same source, means that there is a shared interest between the inspection body and its client. The circumstances described are such that they can influence the outcome of an inspection.